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SEX, LAW, AND THE SACRED PRECINCTS OF THE
MARITAL BEDROOM: ON STATE AND FEDERAL
RIGHT TO PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE
MARK STRASSER*
INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy includes the right to make important
decisions regarding marriage, family, and children. However,
there is some controversy regarding the degree to which substan-
tive due process rights protect gays and lesbians. Taking their
cue from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick,1 many jurists and commentators suggest that the right
to privacy does not protect the right of same-sex couples to
marry, establish families, or have children. Yet, appearances to
the contrary notwithstanding, Bowers suggests that the right to
privacy may well protect lesbian and gay families and further,
that those courts in states with more robust right to privacy pro-
tections than are contained within the Federal Constitution
might have great difficulty in explaining why their own substan-
tive due process guarantees do not include the right to marry a
same-sex partner.
Part I of this Article discusses right to privacy jurisprudence
in light of Bowers v. Hardwick and Romer v. Evans,2 concluding
that the Bowers Court's refusal to strike down Georgia's sodomy
statute is best understood in light of the relevant jurisprudence
privileging marital over nonmarital and extramarital acts. Part II
discusses some state constitutional decisions in which sodomy
statutes have been struck down based on state constitutional
guarantees protecting the right to privacy, concluding that
although courts in those states may be able to offer a plausible
analysis of the right to privacy that would not require the invali-
dation of adultery statutes, the same courts will have far greater
difficulty in offering a credible rationale to justify their claims
that the state constitution does not protect the right to marry a
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Profes-
sor of Law, Capital University Law School. I would like to thank George Cron-
heim for his helpful discussions of these and related issues and Prof. Alan
Hornstein for his suggestions about how I might improve the title of this piece.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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same-sex partner. The Article concludes that both state and fed-
eral courts will have great difficulty in offering a plausible expla-
nation of why the national and, especially, certain state
constitutions do not include same-sex marriage within their right
to privacy protections.
I. INTERPRETING BOWiiRs
In Bowers, the United States Supreme Court refused to rec-
ognize "a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,"3
instead upholding a Georgia sodomy law criminalizing both
same-sex and opposite-sex sodomitical relations. Jurists and com-
mentators have suggested that the Court's unwillingness to rec-
ognize a constitutional right to have consensual sodomitical
relations strongly suggests that the right to marry a same-sex part-
ner will not be recognized as falling within the substantive due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.4 However, it is not clear that such a conclu-
3. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
4. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 363 n.5 (D.C. App.
1995) (Steadman, J., concurring) (suggesting that if "the state could ban the
commission of acts presumably to be expected in such a same-sex relationship,
it is difficult to understand on what basis the state constitutionally could be
forced to extend the recognition of marriage to that relationship"); PatrickJ.
Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition
of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 147, 151 (1998) (given Bow-
ers, same-sex marriage proponents face an impossible uphill climb in making
substantive due process arguments under the Federal Constitution); Andrew H.
Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural,
Canonical and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 How. L.J. 173, 214
(1992) (Bowers "deals a serious, if not fatal, blow to any arguments that state
prohibitions against same-sex marriages are unconstitutional"); Lisa M.
Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A View From
the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 246 (1996) ("Because the Bowers court
explicitly refused to recognize a right for homosexuals to engage in consensual
sexual relationships, a federal doctrine offers little promise for same-sex mar-
riage litigation."); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans:
Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175,
184 (1997) ("The argument for same-sex marriage based on the general right
to privacy or the Due Process Clause has probably been foreclosed by Bowers v.
Hardwick."); Richard Ante, Same-Sex Marriage and the Construction of Family: An
Historical Perspective, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 421, 424 (1995) (book review)
(Given Bowers, "the case law seems to signal a defeat for proponents of same-sex
unions") cf Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), different
results reached on en banc rehearing at 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (suggesting
that Bowers stands for the proposition that substantive due process protections
apply to heterosexuals but not gays and lesbians); but see Storrs v. Holcomb, 645
N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (1996) (distinguishing between sodomy and the exchange of
personal commitments involved in marriage).
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sion is warranted, at least in part, because the Court was not suffi-
ciently explicit about why the right to privacy did not include
consensual sodomy.
A. The Implications of Bowers for the Right to Many a
Same-Sex Partner
It may seem strange to suggest that the Bowers Court was not
sufficiently explicit about why sodomy was not protected by the
right to privacy, since the Court offered several justifications for
its holding, any one of which would seem to have sufficed. For
example, the Court suggested that "to claim a right to engage in
such conduct [sodomy] is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' or 'implicitly in the concept of ordered liberty' is,
at best facetious,"5 implying that unless a practice or activity
could plausibly be described in those terms it would not be
included within the right to privacy. The difficulty with this justi-
fication was not that the Court was wrong to conclude that the
protection of sodomy was not deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition,' but merely that the Court might have made
the same point about contraception,7 abortion,' and interracial
marriage,9 and each of those is nonetheless protected by the
right to privacy.' ° Thus, although the Court was no doubt cor-
rect that sodomy has been criminalized historically,'1 it is not at
all clear that the point establishes that sodomitical relations are
not protected by the Constitution.
The Bowers Court rejected the idea that the Georgia sodomy
statute was invalid as a majoritarian attempt to impose particular
5. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
6. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 343 (Ferren, J., concurring & dissenting) (sug-
gesting that both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy have not been pro-
tected historically).
7. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) ("Section 21 stems
from Mass. Stat. 1879, c. 159, § 1, which prohibited, without exception, distribu-
tion of articles intended to be used as contraceptives."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 501 (1961) ("The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives
has been on the state's books since 1879.").
8. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) ("The Texas statutes under
attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many states for
approximately a century.").
9. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
847-48 (1992) (noting that "interracial marriage was illegal in most states in the
19th century").
10. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great, Slumber-
ing Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64
FoRP ,MAm L. REv. 921, 971-72 (1995) (suggesting that these are protected
notwithstanding their having been criminalized historically).
11. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 n.5, 193 n.6 (1986).
756 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
moral values on a disfavored minority, 12 suggesting that the law
"is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws repre-
senting essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the Courts will be very busy indeed."13 Yet,
the claim was not that any statute promoting morality must be
struck down-statutes prohibiting murder serve legitimate non-
moral ends and thus are permissible-but merely that statutes
which promote no legitimate nonmoral ends and, perhaps,
which are designed to punish a disfavored minority,1 4 should be
struck down.
1 5
The Bowers Court accepted that consensual sodomy was a vic-
timless crime but then suggested that, after all, other "victimless"
crimes are permissibly criminalized. However, the Court's argu-
ment was unpersuasive, since its examples-the possession of
drugs, guns, and stolen property' 6-were hardly victimless
crimes.' 7 The Court further undermined its own persuasiveness
when suggesting that it could not distinguish between adultery
and sodomy,18 as if the promise-breaking and breach of trust
likely involved in the former but not the latter provide no rele-
vant basis for differentiation.'9
As a separate point, were the Court serious when implying
that the right of privacy would not protect practices that society
viewed as immoral, the Court would have some difficulty in
explaining why abortion, contraception, and interracial marriage
were all protected by the right to privacy, notwithstanding their
being or having been viewed as immoral. 2' Thus, while numer-
ous reasons were offered to reject that sodomy was protected by
12. But cf. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992)
("We view the United States Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick...
as a misdirected application of the theory of original intent. To illustrate: as a
theory of majoritarian morality, miscegenation was an offense with ancient
roots.").
13. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
14. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Equal
protection issues were not raised in Bowers. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8.
15. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Penn. 1980) ("With
respect to regulation of morals, the police power should properly be exercised
to protect each individual's right to be free from interference in defining and
pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons
whose conduct does not harm others.").
16. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.
17. See id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. See id. at 195-96.
19. See id. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[A] State might con-
clude that adultery is likely to injure third persons, in particular, spouses and
children of persons who engage in extramarital affairs.").
20. Cf supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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the right to privacy, many of those reasons were specious and,
further, would not account for why those practices already recog-
nized as protected by the right to privacy are in fact protected.
The Bowers Court suggested that the right to privacy did not
include consensual sodomy because there was no evidence of any
connection between that activity on the one hand and family,
marriage, or procreation on the other.2 ' If that is the reason,
22
however, then Bowers does not preclude the Court's recognizing
that the right to privacy protects the right to marry a same-sex
partner. While the Court might plausibly deny a connection
between a one-night stand (which happened to involve sodomiti-
cal relations) 23 on the one hand and marriage and family on the
other,24 the Court could not plausibly deny a connection
between same-sex unions on the one hand and marriage and
family on the other.25 Exactly what is at issue in the same-sex
marriage debate is whether same-sex couples will be able to form
a legally recognized marriage or family, and thus this Bowers line
of argument supports rather than undermines that the right to
privacy protects same-sex marriage.
A separate question is whether connection to marriage and
family in fact is the relevant criterion.26 If, instead, the relevant
question is whether the activity or status at issue is fundamental
21. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
22. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Reasons and the Limitation of Liberty, 40
WM. & MARY L. REv. 947, 950 (1999) (In the majority opinion in Bowers, Justice
White "interpreted the previous privacy cases as concerned essentially with mar-
riage, family life and reproductive autonomy and argued that, because homo-
sexual sodomy engages none of these values, it should not be conceptualized as
a fundamental privacy right and thus that strict scrutiny was not required").
23. It is contested whether what was at issue in Bowers involved a one-
night stand or, instead, consensual sexual relations between lovers. Compare
Mary Ann Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal
History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. REv. 1643, 1652 (1993)
(Hardwick's sexual partner that day "was a schoolteacher from North Carolina,
a married man, and a one-night stand"), with Leslye M. Huff, Deconstructing Sod-
omy, 5 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 553, 561-62 (1997) (describing Hardwick's sexual
partner as his lover).
24. Of course, one-night stands sometimes turn into more lasting rela-
tionships, although that is a separate point.
25. But seeJohn G. Culhane, Uprooting the Arguments Against Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 20 CARDozo L. REv. 1119, 1148-49 (1999):
[I]t would be a mistake to think it inevitable that courts will discover
this link between the elements of family life and same-sex marriage.
Explicit recognition of the latter would.. . [challenge] the rigidity of
gender roles and identity that conspires with political will to deny the
creative possibility and richness in all lives of committed intimate
relation.
26. See infra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
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to concepts of personhood,2 7 then both same-sex marriages and
adult, consensual, nonmarital,28 sexual activity should be recog-
nized as protected by the right to privacy. Arguably, the latter is
the appropriate criterion29 and, thus, the claim here is neither
that Bowers was rightly decided nor that Bowers should not have
been litigated,30 but merely that the jurisprudence articulated in
Bowers does not undermine the claim that the Federal Constitu-
tion protects the right to marry a same-sex partner.3 r
B. Different Understandings of Bowers
Notwithstanding that the right to marry a same-sex partner
might be protected by the right to privacy even if the right to
commit sodomy is not, a variety of commentators have suggested
that Bowers is incompatible with a federally recognized right to
same-sex marriage.32 The arguments that Bowers precludes such
a recognition might helpfully be separated into three different
categories. The first concerns itself with the language of the
opinion, suggesting that same-sex marriage does not meet the
relevant test for determining whether the activity at issue is pro-
tected by the right to privacy. The second concerns itself with
the substance of the decision, suggesting that because sodomy is
27. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a
Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of con-
ducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a rela-
tionship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the
form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.
28. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (contrasting nonmarital
versus extramarital activity).
29. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (suggesting that "matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment"); but see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) ("That
many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in
personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.").
30. Cf. Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990's
USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 4-
5 (1994) (suggesting that it is wrong to assert that Bowers involved bad facts and
should not have been litigated).
31. See JOHN H. GARvEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 26-31 (1996) (sug-
gesting that Bowers was an easy case but that a strong argument can be made for
the state's having to recognize same-sex marriages). While Dean Garvey is
wrong about Bowers, he is correct that Bowers does not preclude an argument for
same-sex marriage.
32. See supra note 4.
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illegal and because same-sex couples would presumably be hav-
ing sodomitical relations if permitted to marry, the right to pri-
vacy obviously cannot include the right to marry a same-sex
partner. The third concerns itself with the tone rather than the
language or substance of the opinion, suggesting that even if
Bowers does not substantively preclude same-sex marriage, the
attitude manifested by the Court in that opinion indicates the
Court's understanding that the Constitution permits the imposi-
tion of burdens on lesbians, bisexuals, and gays that could not be
imposed on other groups.
33
Some commentators examining the language of Bowers sug-
gest that same-sex marriage cannot be included within the right
to privacy because such unions are not deeply rooted in the his-
tory and traditions of the country.34 Yet, this test would not have
yielded protection for much that is protected by the right to pri-
vacy,35 and thus is simply an inappropriate test for making the
relevant determination.
Ironically, some theorists when explicating the history and
traditions test seem not to appreciate the implications of their
own positions. For example, those commentators who suggest
that the history and traditions test protects interracial marriage,
36
because marriage and family are deeply embedded in the coun-
try's history and traditions even if interracial marriages in partic-
ular are not,37 seem not to appreciate the force of the analogous
argument that might be made about same-sex marriages-even if
same-sex marriages are not deeply rooted in this nation's history
and tradition, marriage and family are and thus same-sex unions
might nonetheless be protected.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has pointed out that "misce-
genation was an offense with ancient roots. '38 Since interracial
33. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down state
constitutional amendment disadvantaging lesbians, bisexuals, and gays because
it seemed "inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affect[ed]").
34. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for
Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. Rxv. 1, 33.
35. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond:
Due Process In 1998, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 253, 269 (1998).
37. See Michael R. Engleman, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Role of Privacy-
Only Within the Traditional Family ?, 26J. FAM. L. 373, 390 (1987-88) ("In Lovingv.
Virginia, the Court upheld an individual's decision to define his identity
through marriage to someone of a race different from his, even though such
interracial marriages were, at the time of the decision, illegal in sixteen states
and counter to theological teachings.").
38. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Ky. 1992).
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marriage was itself criminalized until 1967,"9 one would expect
the theorists arguing that same-sex marriage does not meet the
history and traditions test to make the same point about interra-
cial unions. By taking the opposite tack, these theorists offer an
understanding of that test that might also be applicable here.
Just as the history and traditions test might be thought to protect
interracial unions, historical practices notwithstanding, that test
might also be thought to protect same-sex unions, historical prac-
tices notwithstanding. Indeed, an Alaska trial court has already
recognized that the historic place in our hierarchy of values
occupied by marriage and family may well entail that same-sex
unions are constitutionally protected.4 °
Other commentators consider the substance of Bowers and
suggest that because sodomy is permissibly criminalized, same-
sex marriage is obviously not constitutionally protected.4" Yet,
this argument is unpersuasive for a few different reasons. First,
as a practical matter, most states do not criminalize sodomy,42 so
it is unclear why any of those states would nonetheless be permit-
ted to claim, for example, that permitting sodomitical relations
so strongly offends public policy that same-sex unions cannot be
legally recognized." Second, even those states that have sodomy
laws have created exceptions for married couples either through
their legislatures or their courts.44 Indeed, since Griswold v. Con-
39. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's ban
in interracial marriage).
40. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
88743, at *4 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) ("[T]he relevant question is not
whether same-sex marriage is so rooted in our traditions that it is a fundamen-
tal right, but whether the freedom to choose one's own life partner is so rooted
in our traditions.").
41. See supra note 4.
42. There are 14 states which criminalize both same-sex and opposite-sex
sodomitical relations and five states which criminalize only same-sex sodomiti-
cal relations. See ACLU, Status of U.S. Sodomy Laws (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http:/
/www.aclu.org/issues/gay/sodomy.html> [hereinafter ACLU].
43. Cf Steven K_ Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505, 530 (1994) ("After Bowers v. Hardwick, every state that has a same-sex
sodomy law can plausibly argue that it need not recognize a Hawaii same-sex
marriage because it has a constitutionally sound public policy against sodomy,
an act likely to be committed in a same-sex marriage.") (emphasis added).
44. See, e.g., Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (W.D. Va. 1969)
(recognizing exception for marrieds but holding that the exception is inappli-
cable where force has been used); Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986) (recognizing exception for marrieds but holding that the exception
is inapplicable where force has been used); State v. Dubish, 675 P.2d 877, 886
(Kan. 1994) (striking down conviction for aggravated sodomy because defend-
ant and victim were married); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980) (recogniz-
ing exception for married couples).
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necticut,45 where the Court explained that the Constitution bars
states from searching for contraceptives in "the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms,"4 6 it has not been at all clear that the Con-
stitution permits states to criminalize consensual, marital,
sodomitical relations.4 7 Thus, even in states with sodomy stat-
utes, same-sex, married couples would presumably fall within an
existing explicit or implicit exception to those statutes rather
than be likely violators of those statutes.4 8
Commentators who claim that the permissibility of sodomy
statutes established the permissibility of same-sex marriage
prohibitions seem to forget recent constitutional history. In
McLaughlin v. Florida,4 9 the State of Florida argued that its pun-
ishing interracial coupling more severely than intraracial coup-
ling was reasonably related to its goal of preventing interracial
marriage.5 ° The Supreme Court rejected that argument, sug-
gesting that each statute had to be examined on its own merits5 1
and that "the State's policy against interracial marriage [can] ...
be as adequately served by the general, neutral, and existing ban
on illicit behavior as by a provision . . . which singles out the
promiscuous interracial couple for special statutory treatment."
52
The Court struck down the Florida statute at issue without
expressing an opinion about whether Florida's interracial mar-
riage ban was itself constitutional. 3 By doing so, the Court
emphasized that statutes regulating marriage and statutes regu-
lating nonmarital sexual relations implicate different issues and
thus their constitutionality may hinge on different factors.
The McLaughlin Court did not even hint that a statute regu-
lating nonmarital relations would be unconstitutional, "dealing
45. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
46. Id. at 485.
47. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 187, 218 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("Our prior cases thus establish that a State may not prohibit sodomy
within 'the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms.'").
48. See Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Mariage: On Legal
Analysis and Fundamental Interests, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 335 (1998).
49. 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (striking down Florida's statute punishing inter-
racial cohabitation more severely than intraracial cohabitation).
50. See id. at 195.
51. See id. ("For even if we posit the constitutionality of the ban against
the marriage of a Negro and a white, it does not follow that the cohabitation
law is not to be subjected to independent examination under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
52. Id. at 196.
53. See id. ("We accordingly invalidate § 798.05 without expressing any
views about the State's prohibition of interracial marriage, and reverse these
convictions.").
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as it does with illicit extramarital and premarital promiscuity.
5 4
Rather, the Court established that special penalties could not be
imposed on unmarried, interracial couples having sexual rela-
tions, conveniently ignoring the fact that because interracial
couples could not marry in Florida they could only have
"nonmarital" relations if they were to have sexual relations at all.
The Court did not strike down interracial marriage bans until
three years later,55 although the opportunity to do so had been
presented in the mid-1950s.56
It is perhaps underappreciated that miscegenation might
refer to interracial coupling or to interracial marriage. 57 Former
laws prohibiting interracial coupling are analogous to current
laws prohibiting same-sex sodomy," since in each case special
penalties were or are being imposed as a way of burdening disfa-
vored groups. Because such laws target specific groups, they may
be constitutionally offensive even if the general behavior that
they seek to regulate is permissibly proscribed.59
Former laws prohibiting interracial marriage are analogous
to current laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, since in each case
individuals are being prevented from marrying their would-be
spouses, notwithstanding the clear public policy reasons support-
ing the recognition of such unions.6" Indeed, many of the spe-
cious arguments currently offered in an attempt to justify same-
sex marriage bans echo the specious reasons formerly offered in
attempts to justify interracial marriage bans.
Here, the issue is whether a state with a sodomy statute
could thereby justify its same-sex marriage ban. As suggested
both by the McLaughlin Court's requirement that Florida's inter-
racial fornication and marriage statutes be examined separately,
54. Id. at 193.
55. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's stat-
utory scheme barring interracial marriages as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
56. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (denial that federal question
presented in Virginia's antimiscegenation law), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 891
(1955) (remand to Virginia courts for clarification after Virginia antimiscegena-
tion law challenged).
57. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 981, 1020 (1991).
58. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 1994) ("A person
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another
individual of the same sex.").
59. The sodomy laws at issue in Bowers were not challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 187, 196 n.8 (1986).
60. See Strasser, supra note 10, at 979-80 (describing some of those public
policy considerations supporting the recognition of same-sex marriage).
2000] SEX, LAW, AND THE SACRED PRECINCTS OF THE MARITAL BEDROOM 763
each needing to be justified on its own merits, and by the Gris-
wold Court's recognition of marital privacy, the permissibility of a
sodomy statute hardly establishes that same-sex marriage is not
protected by the right to privacy.
Were the issue presented before the Court today, the cur-
rent Supreme Court would presumably say that while interracial
marriage bans are unconstitutional, statutes banning nonmarital,
intraracial and interracial coupling are not so protected,
although the state is of course precluded from punishing the lat-
ter more severely than the former.6' So, too, the Court might
say, even if statutes banning same-sex marriage are unconstitu-
tional, statutes prohibiting sodomy (especially if not distinguish-
ing between same-sex and opposite-sex couples) might
nonetheless be upheld.62 The historical treatment of interracial
coupling and marriage and the current treatment of same-sex
coupling and marriage are much more analogous than some
commentators seem willing to admit.6"
Still other commentators address the tone of the Bowers opin-
ion, suggesting that even if the substance of the opinion has no
implications for same-sex unions, the tone of the opinion indi-
cates that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are not protected by the
Federal Constitution. That kind of analysis is more difficult to
critically evaluate, since at least two issues would have to be
addressed: (1) whether, in fact, lesbians, bisexuals, and gays are
not entitled to all of the protections taken for granted by many
people; and (2) if, in fact, not all protections are applicable,
which are not or, perhaps, under what conditions are those pro-
tections inapplicable. Using the tone analysis, one simply cannot
even know which kinds of arguments could be successfully mar-
shaled to show that the rights of bisexuals, lesbians, and gays had
61. In Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872), overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala.
190 (1877), the Alabama Supreme Court found that the state's intraracial mar-
riage statute violated equal protection guarantees. However, in Ford v. State, 53
Ala. 150 (1875), the Alabama Supreme Court upheld punishing interracial
adultery more severely than intraracial adultery without overruling Burns, which
was not overruled until two years later. While McLaughlin and Loving establish
that differentiation on the basis of race is impermissible whether the statute
involves marital or nonmarital coupling, the point here is merely that a fornica-
tion statute which did not differentiate on the basis of race could be upheld
even if an interracial marriage ban would be found unconstitutional.
62. But see infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text (describing reason-
ing offered by state courts to establish that sodomy statutes violate their own
state constitutional guarantees). The reasoning offered by the courts would
also seem applicable to federal constitutional protections, Supreme Court
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
63. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 201 (1998).
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been violated in a particular case,64 especially when issue two is
not explicitly addressed and the suggestion instead is that a dif-
ferent standard is applicable to lesbians, bisexuals, and gays with-
out a specification of what that higher standard is or how it
differs from the standards against which others are judged.65
Consider Judge Reinhardt's dissenting opinion in Watkins v.
United States Army,6 6 where he suggested that Bowers must be read
either as "about 'sodomy,' and heterosexual sodomy is as consti-
tutionally unprotected as homosexual sodomy, or it is about
'homosexuality,' and there are some acts which are protected if
done by heterosexuals but not if done by homosexuals."67 He
regretfully6 concluded that it was about the latter, believing that
the "anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court's willing-
ness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the
government, are clear.
69
C. Scalia on Bowers
It is not difficult to understand how someone might infer
that Bowers relegated lesbians and gays to second-class citizen sta-
tus, 70 since at least some members of the current Court seem to
interpret Bowers that way. For example, in his dissent in Romer,
Justice Scalia suggested that the issue in Romer-whether the
electorate could constitutionally preclude lesbians and gays from
receiving the kinds of protections71 that other groups in the state
64. See Dunlap, supra note 30, at 31 ("There can be little doubt that there
is a higher standard in this system, approaching a double one, for gay men,
lesbians, and bisexual and transgendered persons who publicly identify our sex-
ualities."); Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO.
L.J. 261, 277 (1995) (discussing a "double standard of permissiveness toward
straights and censoriousness toward gays who engage in acts that are essentially
the same").
65. Cf Larry Kramer, Whose Constitution Is It Anyway ?, in LESBIANS, GAY
MEN, AND THE LAW 563 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (suggesting that con-
stitutional protections simply do not apply to lesbians, bisexuals, and gays).
66. 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1988), superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), withdrawn on rehearing by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
67. Id. at 1452 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 1451-52 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("With great reluctance, I
have concluded that I am unable to concur in the majority opinion.").
69. Id. at 1453 (Reinhardt,J., dissenting).
70. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down state
constitutional amendment because it seemed "inexplicable by anything but ani-
mus toward the class it affect[ed]").
71. The amendment read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
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were already receiving 72-was already settled by Bowers.7" How-
ever, it was not obvious why Bowers-a case involving the constitu-
tionality of Georgia's sodomy statute criminalizing both same-sex
and opposite-sex sodomitical relations 74-would be dispositive of
the question at issue in Romer, since Colorado had been one of
the first states to repeal its own sodomy statute 75 and was not
attempting to recriminalize that activity. Thus, were Bowers
"merely" holding that same-sex sodomitical relations were not
protected by the right to privacy, 76 one could not thereby infer
that the Constitution therefore permitted "homosexuality ...
[to] be singled out for disfavorable treatment. '7'  Nonetheless,
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist so construe that decision
and the Constitution,78 notwithstanding that the Bowers rationale
would apply to any nonmarital, sodomitical relations, regardless
of the sexes of the parties involved. 9
When the Bowers Court noted, "Sodomy was a criminal
offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the orig-
inal thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights,""° the
Court failed to mention that both heterosexual and homosexual
sodomy were proscribed at common law.8" The test articulated
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
tion, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim
of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.
Id. at 624.
72. Both suspect and nonsuspect groups were protected by Colorado law.
See id. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder Bowers, Amendment 2
is unquestionably constitutional as applied to those who engage in homosexual
conduct.").
74. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
75. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Of course, it should not be thought that the deprivation effected by
Bowers involved nothing important; indeed one of the failings in the decision
was to undervalue the importance of the liberty at issue. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at
208 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the "Court's failure to comprehend
the magnitude of the liberty interests at stake").
77. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636.
78. Justices Rehnquist and Thomas signed onto Justice Scalia's dissent.
79. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 343 (D.C. App. 1995)
(suggesting that Bowers permits criminalizing nonmarital, heterosexual,
sodomitical relations); Cf State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276, 277 (R.I. 1995)
(holding that "the State may prosecute unmarried, consenting, heterosexual,
adult[s] who engage in act[s] of cunnilingus").
80. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
81. See id. at 215 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
766 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
by the Bowers Court does not justify selecting lesbians, bisexuals,
and gays for special adverse treatment, Justice Scalia's claims to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Justice Scalia suggested that the Colorado initiative at issue
in Romer was probably motivated by animus, although he denied
that the animus was constitutionally impermissible.8 2 Rather, he
suggested that because sodomy was criminalizable and because it
was reasonable to assume that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals would
have a desire to commit that criminalizable conduct, it was per-
missible to impose burdens on that group.83
D. Implications of Scalia's Position
Justice Scalia's position has some surprising implications.
Suppose, for example, that one accepts the Bowers rationale that
sexual practices whose proscriptions have "ancient roots"84 may
be criminalized. This would mean that states could criminalize
heterosexual sodomy,85 adultery,8 6 and fornication," as well asinterracial marriage88 and marital sodomy.8" Further, because
82. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensi-
ble-murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and
could exhibit even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that is the
only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual
conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that produced the centu-
ries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.
83. See id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
85. See State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276, 277 (R.I. 1995) (upholding sod-
omy statute for unmarrieds); but seeACLU, supra note 42 (listing Rhode Island's
statute as having been repealed).
86. See City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996) (adultery
not constitutionally protected). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The state of Connecticut does have
statutes, the constitutionality of which is beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery
and fornication.").
87. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 343 (D.C. App. 1995)
(suggesting that fornication statutes are constitutional); see also Griswold, 381
U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (holding fornication statute
constitutional).
88. See Lois Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy After Washington v. Gluck-
sberg: An Essay About Abortion, Death, and Crime, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
431, 434 (1998):
But the suggestion that constitutionally protected rights and liberties
are restricted to those already recognized in our history and tradition
should concern us all.., the right to marry interracially and the right
to have an abortion were hard-fought battles precisely because the spe-
cific practices given constitutional protection by those cases had long
been outlawed.
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any of these could be criminalized, Justice Scalia's analysis sug-
gests that the Constitution would permit anyone who would even
have a desire to commit any of those to be subject to having
unwanted burdens imposed upon him or her.
It would be true but irrelevant to point out that the fact
those practices were once criminalized hardly establishes that
they are not now constitutionally protected. Such a criticism
involves a rejection of the criterion that was implicitly offered for
determining the constitutionality of particular practices and
might cast doubt on the vitality of Bowers.9° Indeed, such a point
might imply that the Court should engage in the kind of rea-
soned judgment in light of the existing jurisprudence that the
plurality endorsed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,91 but that Jus-
tice Scalia rejected.92
Nonetheless, suppose that one limits one's focus to practices
that the Court has not (yet) declared protected by the right to
privacy, for example, adultery and fornication. Some estimate
that the percentage of the population engaging in such practices
is very high, although those estimates are controversial.93 Yet,
Justice Scalia's comments suggest that not only those committing
89. Thus, marital sodomy was also thought criminalizable. See State v.
Nelson, 271 N.W. 114, 118 (Minn. 1937) (consensual marital sodomitical rela-
tions can be punished).
90. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 n.65 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("We also note, without surprise, that in the decade since Bowers was
handed down the Court has never cited its central holding approvingly."), rev'd,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
91. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
849 (1992).
92. See id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(rejecting the reasoned judgment approach and instead suggesting that a prac-
tice is not protected if "(1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it,
and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be
legally proscribed").
93. See Phyllis Coleman, Who's Been Sleeping in My Bedi? You and Me, and the
State Makes Three, 24 IND. L. REV. 399, 399 (1991) ("[A]n estimated sixty percent
of the adult American population has committed [adultery]."); Alice Susan
Andre-Clark, Note, Whither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1933,
1948 (1992) (describing the "number of people who engage in premarital sex"
as "overwhelming"); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions
On Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1660, 1661 (1991) [hereinafter
Note] ("[O]ver seventy-five percent of women and over eighty percent of men
have had premarital sex by age nineteen."); id. at 1671 ("A majority of men and
a near-majority of women admit to having engaged in extramarital sex."); but see
Neil D. Rosenberg, The President in Crisis, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec. 19,
1998, at 10 (suggesting that only roughly eighteen percent of married people
engage in extramarital affairs rather than the much higher percentages claimed
by others).
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adultery and fornication but also those who have a "tendency or
desire to do so'94 may permissibly have burdens imposed upon
them-the potentially burdened group would include, for exam-
ple, those who had lusted in their hearts for someone to whom
they were not married, even if the lusting individuals had never
in fact acted on those inclinations.95 Thus, according to this the-
ory, anyone who desired to have premarital or extramarital sex-
ual relations would be tempted to commit a criminalizable (even
if not criminalized) act and would be subject to disadvantageous
treatment should the state deem the imposition of such treat-
ment appropriate.96
Some who might be subject to having these burdens
imposed upon them might claim never to have even been tempted
to have premarital or extramarital sex.9 7 Justice Scalia would pre-
sumably suggest that those individuals "might successfully bring
an as-applied challenge" to the statute envisioned here.98 In
response to the claim that individuals should not be disadvan-
taged on the mere presumption that they would engage in these
criminalizable if not criminalized activities, Justice Scalia might
suggest that because no criminal penalty was at issue, sexual
desires would be "an acceptable stand-in for ... conduct."99
In his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia made clear his belief that
it is permissible for a state to pass an amendment which "with-
94. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 642 (1996).
95. Cf Paul Finkelman, Cultural Speech and Political Speech in Historical Per-
spective, 79 B.U. L. REv. 717, 731 n.93 (1999) (book review) (discussing Jimmy
Carter's admission in an interview that he had looked on many women with lust
and thus committed adultery in his heart).
96. Justice Scalia did not claim that gays, lesbians or bisexuals were subject
to more uncontrollable urges than others and thus, for example, would be
more likely to give in to such urges. Claims that unpopular groups are subject
to uncontrollable urges are not uncommon. See Constance Backhouse, The
White Women's Labor Laws: Anti-Chinese Racism in Early Twentieth Century Canada,
14 LAw & HIsT. REv. 315, 335 (1996) (discussing racist claims that black men
had uncontrollable sexual desires for white women); John M. Kang, Deconstruct-
ing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MIcH.J. RACE & L. 283, 341 (1997) (discussing
stereotype of black men as subject to uncontrollable sexual urges); David P.
Tedhams, The Reincarnation of Jim Crow": A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of Colo-
rado's Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 133, 153 (1994) (sug-
gesting that members of stigmatized groups are often characterized as
hypersexual); cf Alan L. Keyes, How Should Society Handle Injustice ?, 19 HARv.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 645, 647-48 (1996) (conflating the claim that sexual orientation
cannot be controlled with the claim that one's sexual urges cannot be
controlled).
97. The credibility of the claim that the person had never even been
tempted would be up to the trier of fact to assess.
98. Romer517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
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draws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protec-
tions from the injuries caused by discrimination, and [which] . ..
forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies,"100 because the
state could (even if, in fact, it did not) have a law criminalizing
sodomy.' 0 ' Yet, the fact that the state did not have such a law
presumably indicates that it did not believe the conduct at issue
sufficiently worrisome to merit criminal sanctions. Were the state
in fact to have criminalized the activity, one might expect Justice
Scalia to have been willing to give the state even more leeway to
impose burdens on people who had a desire to commit the activ-
ity in question.
While Colorado does not have a law criminalizing sodomy, it
does have a law prohibiting adultery.10 2 One wonders what civil
penalties against possible adulterers Justice Scalia would be will-
ing to countenance and what kinds of showings of propensities
or desires he would constitutionally require before such penalties
could be imposed. After all, it might be argued, sexual desires
for the object of one's lust can be strong and, even if that person
is a nonspouse, might well be irrepressible." 3 Since no criminal
penalties would be at issue, Justice Scalia would presumably sug-
gest that the state would not need to wait until the individual had
in fact acted on his or her adulterous desires for these burdens to
be imposed.
E. Marital Versus Nonmarital Acts
Were the Court to have adopted Justice Scalia's position on
Colorado's Amendment 2, one might have accepted Judge Rein-
hardt's analysis of Bowers in which he suggested that the Court
believes lesbians, bisexuals, and gays are not entitled to the same
protections that others receive.'0 4 However, the Court rejected
Justice Scalia's analysis in Romer and, indeed, did not even men-
100. Id. at 627.
101. See id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See COLO. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-501 (West 1999) ("Any sexual inter-
course by a married person other than with that person's spouse is adultery,
which is prohibited.").
103. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 408 (1991) ("Although the vast major-
ity of people are capable of exercising control over their sexual behavior, the
sex drive itself seems virtually irrepressible."); cf Julie Lefler, Shining the Spotlight
on Johns: Moving Toward Equal Treatment of Male Customers and Female Prostitutes,
10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 11, 14-15 (1999) (suggesting that the "Victorian
myth that men could not control their sex drives" resulted in men not being
"faulted for acting upon their irrepressible desires").
104. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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tion Bowers in that opinion."0 5 This could be because the Court
was overruling Bowers sub silentio°6 or because the Court did not
believe Bowers to be on point, perhaps reading (or limiting) the
decision to be only about what it purported to be about, namely,
whether the right to privacy guaranteed in the Federal Constitu-
tion includes the right to commit sodomy.
Even before Bowers, several courts had suggested that the
right to privacy protects marital but not nonmarital sodomy.
10 7
Bracketing whether distinguishing between marrieds and unmar-
rieds this way is rationally supportable or, instead, a violation of
equal protection guarantees, 08 this way of interpreting Bowers
105. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Bowers
"is not even mentioned in the Court's opinion").
106. See Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L.
Ritv. 373, 373 (1997) (suggesting that after Romer, "not much is left of
Hardwick").
107. SeeSchochetv. State, 541 A.2d 183, 195 (Md. App. 1988), overruled on
other grounds, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990) (suggesting that sexual activity outside of
marriage is not protected); State v. Elliot, 551 P.2d 1352, 1353 (N.M. 1976)
(nonmarital sodomy is not constitutionally protected); State v. Poe, 252 S.E.2d
843, 845 (N.C. App. 1979) (nonmarital sexual conduct can be criminalized
without offending federal constitutional guarantees); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d
58, 68 (R.I. 1980) (privacy inapplicable to unmarried sodomy); cf State v.
Holden, 890 P.2d 341, 347 (Idaho App. 1995) (suggesting that Bowers does not
"overrule or reject the privacy right of married couples").
108. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51-52 (Penn. 1980):
[T]o suggest that deviate acts are heinous if performed by unmarried
persons but acceptable when done by married persons lacks even a
rational basis, for requiring less moral behavior of married persons
than is expected of unmarried persons is without basis in logic. If the
statute regulated sexual acts so affecting others that proscription by
law would be justified, then they should be proscribed for all people,
not just the unmarried.
See also People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 944 (N.Y. 1980) (New York Court of
Appeals Judge Jasen rejected the idea that sodomy was protected by the right to
privacy, but concurred in the judgment striking down the sodomy statute
because he could "discern no rational basis upon which the Legislature could
have decided to freely allow the conduct in issue among married people and to
make identical conduct criminal among those for whom that estate is undesir-
able or unattainable"); State v. Lopes, No. P1/90-3789, 1994 WL 930907, at *6
(R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994) (striking down statute criminalizing nonmarital
sexual relations on equal protection grounds), order quashed, 660 A.2d 707 (R.I.
1995); cf Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."); but see State v.
Chiaradio, 660 A.2d 276, 277 (R.I. 1995) (upholding sodomy statute as not vio-
lating equal protection guarantees).
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and the right to privacy jurisprudence would less readily1"9 sup-
port the claim that it is permissible to impose burdens on lesbi-
ans, bisexuals, and gays just because the electorate desires "to
make them unequal to everyone else."110 While the reading of
Bowers suggested here neither makes the decision a well-reasoned
opinion nor even a respectable one,1 1 it would nonetheless
remove some of the taint from one of the Court's more embar-
rassing recent decisions.1
1 2
F. The Fundamental Interest in Marriage
The Court has declared that the "right to marry is of funda-
mental importance for all individuals" '13 and has "routinely cate-
gorized the decision to marry as among the personal decisions
protected by the right to privacy." "' While the Court has recog-
nized that "reasonable regulations that do not significantly inter-
fere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed,"'1 5 the Court has also warned that
"[w] hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests." 6 Entirely preclud-
ing same-sex couples from marrying does more than significantly
interfere with their marital decisionmaking.
Justice Powell recognized that the Court's right-to-marry
jurisprudence might force society to modify some of its existing
109. Arguably, the refusal to allow same-sex marriage itself imposes a
badge of inferiority which makes such laws suspect. The Court has warned that
"clear and hostile discriminations against particular persons and classes, espe-
cially such as are of an unusual character," may well violate the Constitution.
Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
110. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
111. See Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J.
1073, 1091 (1988) (describing Bowers as "deeply flawed"). See also Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting):
I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its analy-
sis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history
than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.
112. See Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L.
REv. 4, 68 (1996) (describing Bowers as "one of the most vilified decisions since
World War II").
113. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 388.
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practices. In his concurrence in Zablocki v. Redhail,1 7 he sug-
gested that the Court's willingness to "subject all state regulation
which 'directly and substantially' interferes with the decision to
marry in a traditional family setting to 'critical examination' or
'compelling state interest' analysis"11 might well have implica-
tions for how the state may regulate same-sex relations.119 Fur-
ther, it simply is not credible to say that gay, lesbian, and bisexual
individuals have the right to marry as long as they marry some-
one of the opposite sex.120 (One can imagine the response were
heterosexuals told that they had a fundamental right to marry-
they just had to marry someone of the same sex.) The fallacy of
saying that individuals of all races have the right to marry as long
as they marry someone of the same race has already been recog-
nized,121 and the fallacy of making an analogous claim on the
basis of sex should also be recognized.
The Court almost glows when it discusses marriage. In Lov-
ing v. Virginia, the Court described the right to marry as "one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men [and women]."122 In Griswold, the Court
described marriage as "a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred," 2 ' and as an "association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in any of [the Court's] . . . prior decisions."' 24 The
Court has clearly and expressly articulated its "historical recogni-
tion that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."'
25
The Zablocki Court suggested that it "would make little sense
to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the rela-
tionship that is the foundation of the family in our society."1
' 26
117. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
118. Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
119. See id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
120. For such a claim, see Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and
Prejudice": Marriage and the Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J.
CoNTEMP. L. 293, 302 (1996).
121. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 n.1l (1967) ("[W]e find the
racial classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment,
even assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all
races.").
122. Id. at 12.
123. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
124. Id.
125. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
126. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
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However, that suggestion has been misinterpreted by some of the
lower courts. For example, in Baehr v. Lewin,127 a plurality of the
Hawaii Supreme Court said: "Implicit in the Zablocki Court's link
between the right to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamen-
tal rights of procreation, childbirth, abortion, and child rearing,
on the other, is the assumption that the one is simply the logical
predicate of the others.' 28 The plurality believed that its Zablocki
analysis "demonstrates that the federal construct of the funda-
mental right to marry-subsumed within the right to privacy
implicitly protected by the United States Constitution-presently
contemplates unions between men and women. 1 29 Yet, this
analysis of the case notwithstanding, Zablocki would seem to
establish that the right of same-sex couples to marry must be rec-
ognized, since marriage is allegedly the logical predicate of hav-
ing and raising children and same-sex couples are having and
raising them.
130
As a separate point, the Baehr plurality misunderstood the
import of Zablocki. The Court in Zablocki and elsewhere is sug-
gesting that the right to marry is as fundamental as the fight to
have and raise children. Marriage is not merely important
because it instrumentally provides a setting in which children
might be raised but is of fundamental importance in its own
right. Families may, but need not, include children. Thus,
even individuals who definitely will not or cannot have children
nonetheless have a fundamental right to marry.13 2 As the
Zablocki Court made clear, the "right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals,"' 3 3 not just for those who are able
and willing to procreate.
The Bowers rationale does not undermine the right to marry
a same-sex partner as long as the test articulated-promotion of
marriage and family-is the relevant test. If the test is whether
the activity or practice is implicit within the concept of ordered
liberty or whether it is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
127. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
128. Id. at 56.
129. Id.
130. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Cir. Ct.
Haw. Dec. 3, 1996) (discussing the parenting abilities of lesbians and gays).
131. So, too, sexual relations are not only for procreation. Cf Campbell
v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 263 (Tenn. App. 1996) ("The first asserted inter-
est, that the statute discourages activity which cannot lead to procreation, is
neither a compelling nor even a constitutionally valid justification for the
Act.").
132. See Strasser, supra note 10, at 962.
133. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added).
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tradition or is such that its nonprotection would violate the col-
lective conscience of the people, then many of those practices
already recognized as falling within the right to privacy are none-
theless at risk. Even the right of marrieds to use contraception
was thought by some not to meet those tests.134 Thus, insofar as
the test for whether something is included within the right to
privacy actually accounts for those practices recognized as pro-
tected by that right and does not merely account for those prac-
tices not so recognized, the right to privacy might well protect
the right to marry a same-sex partner, Bowers notwithstanding.
II. SEXUAL AcTIVITY OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE
When discussing which sexual activities are constitutionally
protected and which are not, members of the Court have sug-
gested that neither fornication nor adultery is constitutionally
protected.1 35 However, merely because both of those are cur-
rently viewed as outside of the realm of privacy rights protected
by the United States Constitution" 6 does not establish that no
constitutionally relevant distinctions can be made between the
two. The Court has suggested that there is an implicit ordering
that privileges marital over nonmarital acts,1"7 but also that might
protect certain nonmarital acts before others. Thus, because for-
nication might plausibly be viewed as less destructive to marriage
than adultery,'38 fornication might be protected by the right to
privacy even if adultery is not, at least according to one under-
standing of the principle underlying right to privacy jurispru-
134. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 518 (1965) (Black, J., dis-
senting) (casting doubt on the claim that the law prohibiting contraception
violated the traditions rooted in the collective conscience of the people); id. at
522-23 (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court was engaging in
Lochnerism by striking down the law); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the law was unwise and asinine but not unconstitutional).
135. See Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164 (1998) (discussing fed-
eral laws prohibiting fornication and adultery without a hint of their being con-
stitutionally suspect, although because neither was at issue in the case before
the Court, the Court might have seen no reason to raise concerns about their
constitutionality); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 n.15 (1973)
(stating that few today would even suggest that adultery or fornication statutes
violate constitutional guarantees); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., con-
curring) (neither statute constitutionally offensive).
136. But see State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (N.J. 1977) (suggesting
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy might protect fornication).
137. But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the fight of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
138. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
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dence. A separate question is whether the "expanded" right to
privacy would include the right to marry a same-sex partner-
needless to say, however, many of the arguments in favor of
including fornication would apply equally, if not more strongly,
in the case of same-sex marriage, assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that the right to marry a same-sex partner is not already
protected by the right to privacy.
A. Harlan's Poe Dissent
In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,139 Justice Harlan outlined a
way of understanding right to privacy jurisprudence which many
on the Court seemed to have adopted. 14' He suggested:
The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the
sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal con-
text in which children are born and brought up, as well as
laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices which express the negative of the proposition,
confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so
deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.
141
It might at first seem misguided to quote from Justice
Harlan's dissent in an article suggesting that same-sex marriage is
protected by the right to privacy, since he groups adultery, forni-
cation, and homosexual practices and then suggests that they are
the "negative" of the legal and social context in which children
are born and raised.142 His concern was "family life,"1 43 the
integrity of which "is something so fundamental that it has been
found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one
139. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
140. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 n.4 (1997) (Souter,
J., concurring) ("The status of the Harlan dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961), is shown by the Court's adoption of its result in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and by the Court's acknowledgment of its status and adop-
tion of its reasoning in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992)."). See also Minnesota v. Hodgson, 497 U.S. 417,
448 n.33 (1990) (quoting with approval Justice Harlan's dissent); Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (writing approvingly of the Harlan
dissent); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring) (quoting with approval Justice Harlan's dissent).
141. Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. As a separate point, Justice Harlan's point about where children are
born and raised may not be accurate empirically. See Strasser, supra note 10, at
953 (discussing illegitimacy rates).
143. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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explicitly granted Constitutional right." '144 He envisioned same-
sex and nonmarital relations as outside of the family and hence
the opposite of that which he believed so foundational. How-
ever, his doing so may have involved a mistake of fact-he simply
may not have imagined that same-sex relationships involve any
more than sex and thus may not have envisioned same-sex indi-
viduals as composing families.' 45
At least two distinct points must be made about Justice
Harlan's analysis. The first point is that his right-to-privacy juris-
prudence is based upon the family without a specification of how
family should be defined. Regardless of whetherJustice Harlan's
perspective was less broad than it might have been or, perhaps,
whether social practices have changed over the past forty years or
so, the issue at hand involves the legal recognition of existing fam-
ilies. The concept of family has evolved over the past several
decades to include additional groups of individuals who function
as families.146 While there may be disagreements about what the
outer contours of this concept should be, same-sex partners (per-
haps with children whom they are raising) are close enough to
the core definition of family that there should be no question
that they should be included. Unless the Court is going to "close
[its] . . . eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated
144. Id. at 551-52.
145. Justice Harlan also discussed the state's ability to define who may
marry whom:
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-
marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite
another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies
inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law
the details of that intimacy.
Id. at 553. It is difficult to tell which marital restrictions he had in mind, for
example, interracial or incestuous. However, given that he signed onto Loving
and, when writing for the majority in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
he recognized that "marriage involves interests of basic importance in our soci-
ety," id. at 376 (citing Loving), it seems clear that he believed the state's power
to limit who may marry whom was not without limit.
146. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 116 (discussing "evolving concepts of family");
William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of
Siblings'Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 745, 769 (1994) (discussing con-
tinually evolving concept of family). See also Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543
N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989):
[A] more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes
two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and charac-
terized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdepen-
dence. This view comports both with our society's traditional concept
of "family" and with the expectations of individuals who live in such
nuclear units.
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with the family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth
Amendment[ ] . .. , [the Court cannot] . .. avoid applying the
force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice
involved in this case." 14 7 It has already been established that the
"Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition,"148 and, as an Alaska trial court has suggested,
'just as the 'decision to marry and raise a child in a traditional
family setting' is constitutionally protected as a fundamental
right, so too should the decision to choose one's life partner and
have a recognized nontraditional family be constitutionally
protected." '149
The second point is that Justice Harlan did not suggest that
the right to privacy must be limited to family but merely that the
doctrine must be built upon that basis. Thus, it would be quite
compatible with his articulated view to expand right to privacy
protections as long as family matters were at its core. As to how
far these protections should be expanded, this is an issue which
state courts are attempting to address in light of their own consti-
tutional rights to privacy protections.
B. On Fornication and Adultery
Traditionally, states criminalized both fornication and adul-
tery.150 Fornication involves an unmarried person's having sex-
ual relations with someone else, whereas adultery involves a
married person's having sexual relations with someone other
than his or her spouse. 51 Thus, two unmarried people having
147. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
148. Id. at 503 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL
8743, at *6 (Super. Ct. Alaska Feb. 27, 1998).
150. See Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosex-
ual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 263, 282
n.183 (1992) ("Sexual morality laws have traditionally included adultery, forni-
cation, sodomy, rape and incest in their list of prohibitions."); Louis A. Alexan-
der, Note, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and
the Law, 70 CORNELL L. RFv. 101, 135 (1984) ("In recognition of traditional
moral and religious values, many jurisdictions enacted criminal statutes against
fornication and adultery."); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The State of Connecticut does have stat-
utes, the constitutionality of which is beyond doubt, which prohibit adultery
and fornication.").
151. See BLACK'S LAw DIcTrIoNARY 653 (6th ed. 1990).
778 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
sexual relations might be guilty of fornication, 152 two married
people having sexual relations might be guilty of adultery
(assuming that they were not married to each other),' and a
married and unmarried individual having sexual relations with
each other might be guilty of different crimes.154
The above method of distinguishing between fornication
and adultery may seem a little surprising, since its focus is not on
whether either party to the affair is married but, rather, on
whether the individual whose conduct is at issue is married.
According to the definition above, an unmarried individual hav-
ing sexual relations with someone is guilty of fornication whether
or not his or her sexual partner is married, and a married indi-
vidual having sexual relations with someone other than his or
her spouse would be guilty of adultery. Thus, a single individual
having an affair with a married person might be guilty of fornica-
tion while his or her partner would be guilty of adultery.155
A variation of the above method of distinguishing between
fornication and adultery involves looking at the marital status of
the woman involved in the affair.1"6 A single woman and a mar-
152. See Hopwood v. State, 45 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1947) ("Since the indict-
ment alleges that both parties were single at the time of the alleged act, the
accused is charged with the offense of fornication only.").
153. See Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674, 676 n.2 (Fla. 1979):
Whoever lives in an open state of adultery shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or
§ 775.083. Where either of the parties living in an open state of adul-
tery is married, both parties so living shall be deemed to be guilty of
the offense provided for in this section.
154. But see Hopwood, 45 S.E.2d at 716 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted):
Under Code § 26-5801, "there are three distinct kinds of indictable
sexual intercourse, viz. adultery, fornication, and adultery and fornica-
tion, the offense in each case being a joint one. If both parties to the
criminal act are married, each is guilty of adultery; if both are single,
each is guilty of fornication; if one is married and the other single,
each is guilty of adultery and fornication."
155. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1999) (an unmarried person com-
mits fornication, a misdemeanor, when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse
with another), with GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (1999) (a married person commits
adultery, a misdemeanor, when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a per-
son other than his spouse); compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (1995) (an
unmarried person who voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse with another is
guilty of fornication, a class B misdemeanor), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103
(1995) (a married person who has sexual intercourse with someone other than
his spouse commits adultery, a Class B misdemeanor).
156. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.36(1) (West 1987) (adultery involves
married woman having sex with a man other than her husband); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.34 (West 1987) (fornication involves a single woman having sexual
intercourse with any man).
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ried man having sexual relations would be guilty of fornication
while a married woman and a single man having sexual relations
would be guilty of adultery. It is unclear whether this method of
differentiating would survive an equal protection challenge.' 5 7 It
is also unclear what crime would have been committed if a mar-
ried woman had an affair with a single woman-as a general mat-
ter, the definitions of fornication and adultery adopted by the
states tended to assume that the individuals having the affair
were not of the same sex.
1 58
Currently, in several states, when an individual has an affair
with someone who is married to a third party, both parties to the
affair may be charged with adultery.' 59 That way, one would not
have the seemingly anomalous situation in which, for example,
Kim is charged with adultery and Dana with fornication when
both knew that Kim was married and both nonetheless volunta-
rily engaged in the affair.
At least two points might be made about this way of defining
adultery, which several states have adopted. First, it would have
important implications for the person who might now be accused
of adultery rather than fornication, since some states punish the
former more severely than the latter, 60 and other states criminal-
ize one without criminalizing the other.'61 Second, where either
party to an affair may be charged with adultery if one of them is
married to someone else, 62 it makes sense to reserve fornication
157. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REv. 1, 43 n.144
(1998) (discussing the double standard involved in such classifications);
Carolyn B. Ramsey, Sex and Social Order: The Selective Enforcement of Colonial Ameri-
can Adultery Laws in the English Context, 10 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 191, 207 (1998)
(book review) (stating that the "definition of adultery as intercourse with a mar-
ried or espoused woman embodied an explicit double standard, for a married
man could not commit adultery by sleeping with a single female").
158. Courts have nonetheless held that individuals of the same sex can
engage in adultery. See, e.g., S.B. v. S.J.B., 609 A.2d 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1992)
(lesbian relationship constitutes adultery); R.G.M. v. D.E.M., 410 S.E.2d 564
(S.C. 1991) (lesbian activity constitutes adultery).
159. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272,
§ 14 (West 1990); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.29 (West 1991); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney 1989); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-70 (Law Co-op. 1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 944.16 (West 1996).
160. See infra note 163 (describing penalties for each in Massachusetts
and Idaho).
161. For example, both New York and Rhode Island have laws criminaliz-
ing adultery but not fornication. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 255.17 (McKinney
1989); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-6-2 (1994).
162. There may be an explicit proviso suggesting that the unmarried per-
son will not be guilty if he or she reasonably believes that the other party is
unmarried. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2(b) (1994).
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for instances in which neither party to the affair is married. That
way, should the state believe that sex between unmarrieds is less
offensive, if offensive at all, than sex between a married person
and a nonspouse, the state would be able to distinguish between
the two.16 Should the state find adultery and fornication equally
offensive, for example, because each involved sexual relations
outside of marriage, then the state could impose the same pen-
alty on either "crime."
164
Even if fornication is limited to instances in which both par-
ties are unmarried, the term still covers very different types of
relationships. For example, it would include two unmarried par-
ties having sexual relations who had lived together for several
years, had had children together, and had been monogamous
for that entire period.165 It might also include two unmarried
parties who had had a one-night stand. In the former case, the
couple has a marriage-like relation even if in fact the state does
not give legal recognition to their relationship.166 In the latter,
the couple has had intimate relations, even if not a long-lasting
relationship. These different relationships might receive differ-
ent constitutional protections, depending upon which principle
determines what is protected by the right to privacy.
167
C. Criminal Versus Civil Penalties
The question of immediate concern in this section is
whether the right to privacy protects the right to commit fornica-
163. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (1997) (person committing adultery shall
have jail sentence not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding $1,000);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1997) (person committing fornication shall have jail
sentence not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding $300); MASs. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 14 (West 1990) (person committing adultery shall be
imprisoned for a term not exceeding three years or fined not more than $500);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 1990) (person guilty of fornication
shall be imprisoned for not more than three months or fined not more than
$30).
164. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (both adul-
tery and fornication subject to fine of not more than $500 or jail term of not
more than a year or both); W.V. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1997) (person guilty of
fornication or adultery shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than
$20).
165. But see Coleman, supra note 93, at 412.
166. The first couple might well not have the option of having a common
law marriage, since only a minority of states recognize such unions. See
Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 n.3 (Penn. 1998) (listing
states still recognizing such marriages). Thus these individuals might not be
recognized as legally married notwithstanding their having lived together as a
family for many years.
167. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
20001 SEX, LAW, AND THE SACRED PRECINCTS OF THE MARITAL BEDROOM 781
tion or adultery. However, even before that is addressed, a sepa-
rate issue must be briefly discussed, if only so that different issues
will not be conflated. Regardless of how much the constitutional
right to privacy includes, the state should neither be criminaliz-
ing fornication nor adultery. Even if one rejects the claim that
adultery is a violation of private rather than public morality'68
and instead believes adultery a violation of both, there are
numerous reasons that it should nonetheless not be criminal-
ized. 6 9 For example, limited public resources are better spent in
enforcing other laws. 170 It is not even clear that society thinks
adultery appropriately punished, since such laws are rarely if ever
enforced.
171
It might be argued that, even if adultery laws are not
enforced, an important message is communicated about society's
views as long as laws prohibiting that conduct remain on the
books. However, it is simply unclear what message unenforced
laws communicate. Perhaps the message is that society disap-
168. Cf William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative
Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 160 (1990):
In all matters concerned directly or indirectly with sexual morality,
from homosexuality to abortion, from pornography to adultery, the
trend both of social mores and of the law has been towards a greater
recognition of the rights of consenting adults to lead their own private
lives without interference from the State.
169. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Cloning and Positive Liberty, 13 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 15, 34 n.37 (1999) (A theorist can "consistently hold
both that adultery should not be subject to criminal prohibition and that it is a
violation of public morality (e.g., a breach of a publicly made marriage promise
whose fulfillment is important to the community at large as well as to the chil-
dren born from the marriage).").
170. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 414 ("[L]imited law enforcement
resources are allocated, and frequently depleted, in fighting more life-threaten-
ing criminal activity."); J. Drew Page, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment
and Sodomy Statutes: The Breakdown of the Solem v. Helm Test, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
367, 391 (1989) (suggesting that "public resources are, and probably should be,
used to police more serious crimes involving violence and loss of life" than sod-
omy or adultery).
171. See Coughlin, supra note 157, at 9 (suggesting that fornication and
adultery statutes violate "contemporary moral and political judgments"); Stuart
Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1601 n.227 (1997) (sug-
gesting that criminal penalties for adultery seem out of place); Toni M. Mas-
saro, The Meanings of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'v &
L. 645, 668 (1997) (discussing the sense that "sexual behaviors, such as adultery
or premarital sex, have been destigmatized"); but see Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey
Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND.
L.J. 453, 479 (1998) (pointing out that states could step up their enforcement
of these laws).
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proves of adultery,172 although the failure to prosecute might
also suggest that society believes adultery permissible 173 or, at the
very least, not particularly offensive. 174 Further, yet another
message might be communicated-by having laws remain on the
books even though those laws are rarely if ever enforced, society
may communicate that it does not believe that its own laws must
be taken seriously. Thus, by having unenforced laws on the
books, society may promote a lack of respect for those laws in
particular or for law more generally.
1 75
As a separate matter, if the goal of laws criminalizing adul-
tery is to promote marriage, they may in fact undermine the very
goal they seek to attain. Threatened or actual imposition of
criminal sanctions would seem unlikely to promote reconcilia-
tion. 17  Further, the threat of such sanctions might also chill
honest and open communication, perhaps blocking the only
path that might lead to a particular marriage being saved. 177
172. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rehabilitating Liberalism in Modern Divorce Law,
1994 UTAH L. REv. 687, 703 n.58 (suggesting that the law reinforces social
norms); cf Traci Shallbetter Stratton, Note, No More Messing Around: Substantive
Due Process Challenges to State Laws Prohibiting Fornication, 73 WAsH. L. REV. 767,
797 (1998) ("Keeping fornication statutes on the books and informing the pub-
lic of their existence might not prevent fornication, but it will send a much
needed message of social disapproval, driving this immoral conduct
underground.").
173. See Sunstein, supra note 112, at 95 (suggesting that "when an old law
is practically unenforced because it does not receive sufficient public approval,
ordinary citizens are permitted to violate it"); but see Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2144 (1998)
("So long as the formal prohibition remains on the statute books, even if largely
unenforced, it has the power to shape conduct: people may not often comply
with a fifty-five mile per hour speed limit, but they drive slower than if the limit
is removed or raised.").
174. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 410 (" [T] he State's consistent failure
to prosecute saps any hope of effective deterrence."); Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 472 n.47 (1997)
("[R]egular non-enforcement or a declination to prosecute or to convict tends
to undermine the norm prohibiting the conduct.").
175. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv.
253, 300 (1996) ("[T]he presence of many unenforced crimes probably breeds
cynicism about the law.").
176. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 403 ("Criminal adultery trials, or even
the mere threat of prosecution, erode rather than enhance the probability for
survival of the marriage."); Martin J. Siegel, For Better orfor Worse: Adultery, Crime
and the Constitution, 30J. FAM. L. 45, 89 (1991-92) ("[I]t is impossible to believe
that a criminal penalty imposed on one of the spouses would somehow benefit
a marriage instead of representing the final nail in its coffin.").
177. But cf N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4502 (a) (McKinney 1992) ("A husband or
wife is not competent to testify against the other in an action founded upon
adultery, except to prove the marriage, disprove the adultery, or disprove a
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Thus, there seem to be a variety of reasons not to criminalize
adultery. Many of these arguments would apply with equal if not
greater force to fornication. Thus, regardless of whether the
United States Constitution prohibits criminal sanctions for adul-
tery or fornication, adult, consensual fornication, sodomy, and
adultery should not be criminalized.
D. A Constitutional Right to Commit Adultery?
The above suggests that a legislature would be wise not to
criminalize certain sexual practices. Nonetheless, a separate
question is whether any or all of these practices are protected by
the right to privacy."' 8 Consider the analysis offered by the
Supreme Court of Texas when it was asked to consider whether
adultery was protected by the right to privacy guaranteed under
the Texas Constitution.179 The court held that adulterous rela-
tions were not protected-, echoing part of Justice Blackmun's
Bowers dissent by pointing out that "adultery often injures third
persons, such as spouses and children."" ° Indeed, the court sug-
gested that adulterous conduct "is the very antithesis of marriage
and family ... [since adultery], by its very nature, undermines
the marital relationship and often rips apart families." ''
Arguably, the Texas court was exaggerating its description of
adultery, since adultery does not by its very nature undermine
marital relationships. Indeed, some claim that adulterous rela-
tionships have strengthened their marriages.182 Thus, perhaps
the Texas court should have claimed that adultery sometimes
destroys marriages when one of the parties has breached his or
defense after evidence has been introduced tending to prove such defense.");
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4502(b) (McKinney 1992) ("A husband or wife shall not be
required, or, without consent of the other if living, allowed to disclose a confi-
dential communication made by one to the other during marriage.").
178. But see Coughlin, supra note 157, at 9 ("[f] f we are now prepared to
agree that fornication and adultery no longer should be criminalized-whether
because these offenses violate contemporary constitutional guarantees or con-
temporary moral and political judgments (to the extent that such judgments differ
from constitutional guarantees) . . . .") (emphasis added).
179. See City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1964).
180. Id. at 470.
181. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass.
1983) ("We take judicial notice that the act of adultery frequently has a destruc-
tive impact on the marital relationship and is a factor in many divorces.").
182. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 411-12 ("[P]aradoxically perhaps,
many spouses report that having an affair actually strengthened their mar-
riages."); cf Siegel, supra note 176, at 90 ("[T] here are many marriages in which
[adulterous] .. .conduct is either tacitly condoned or enthusiastically partici-
pated in together.").
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her promise to be faithful. 183 Still, even if the court's language
was too strong, its point remains. It seems reasonable to assume
both that adultery sometimes destroys marriages and that adul-
tery and fornication are distinguishable in this very respect,
assuming that fornication is limited to relations between individ-
uals who are not married to anyone.
18 4
That fornication would be less likely to destroy existing fami-
lies and might indeed promote family (especially if a functional
definition of family is used)185 might be constitutionally signifi-
cant if in fact the relevant test involves the promotion of family
rather than, for example, whether the activity is of intimate per-
sonal concern. However, where the latter is the relevant test, a
different analysis will be required if, indeed, courts nonetheless
are not going to recognize that the right to privacy protects the
right to commit adultery.
E. State Constitutions
Over the past several years, various state courts have held
that their own state constitutions have broader right to privacy
protections than are contained in the Federal Constitutionl6 -
several state courts have struck down sodomy statutes on state
constitutional grounds. 87 The question at hand is what implica-
tions, if any, these rulings have for the other practices under dis-
cussion here.
183. See Coleman, supra note 93, at 413.
184. Commentators disagree about whether premarital sex promotes or
undermines marriage generally, but that is a different debate. Compare LindaJ.
Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural Feminist
Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1, 30 (1993) ("An
alternative view is that people understand that compatibility is necessary for a
successful marriage and believe that premarital sex and cohabitation give them
an opportunity to decide whether the relationship has a good chance of sur-
vival."), with Leon R. Kass, The End of Courtship, 126 PUB. INTEREST 39, 44 (1997)
("For why would a man court a woman for marriage when she may be sexually
enjoyed, and regularly, without it?").
185. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989)
(offering functional definition of family).
186. See, e.g., Women of State of Minnesota v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 30-
31 (Minn. 1995) (stating that state right to privacy protections are broader than
the analogous federal right); In reJ.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 197 (Tex. 1994)
("Texas due course of law guarantee has independent vitality separate and dis-
tinct from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.")....
187. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993);
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
250 (Tenn. App. 1996).
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In Campbell v. Sundquist,188 a Tennessee appellate court
stated that the "right to privacy provided to Tennesseans under
our Constitution is in fact more extensive than the correspond-
ing right to privacy provided by the Federal Constitution."189
The court also said that "an adult's right to engage in consensual
and noncommercial sexual activities in the privacy of that adult's
home is a matter of intimate personal concern which is at the
heart of Tennessee's protection of the right to privacy."' 19 In
Powell v. State,' the Georgia Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion on similar grounds. The Georgia court wrote: "We
cannot think of any other activity that reasonable people would
rank as more private and more deserving of protection from gov-
ernmental interference than unforced, private, adult sexual activ-
ity. '  The Montana Supreme Court expressed similar
sentiments.1
93
Some commentators have worried that the reasoning of
these and other courts would imply that adultery is also constitu-
tionally protected,' 94 which would seem to prevent the imposi-
tion of any penalties, criminal or civil, for such behavior.'95 At
least two points should be made about such a claim. First, such a
result might not be unwelcome-criminal penalties should not
be imposed for such conduct' 9 6 and, at least in certain kinds of
situations, civil penalties should not be imposed either. For
example, child custody decisions should be made in light of who
would be a better parent rather than in light of who committed
adultery, assuming that no nexus between the adultery and the
parenting can be established.
197
188. 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996).
189. Id. at 261.
190. Id. at 262.
191. 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
192. Id. at 24.
193. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123 (Mont. 1997) ("[I]t is hard to
imagine any activity that adults would consider more fundamental, more pri-
vate and, thus, more deserving of protection from governmental interference
than non-commercial, consensual adult sexual activity.").
194. See Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 30 (Carey, J., dissenting) ("Presumably,
under this new standard, the State can no longer enforce laws against fornica-
tion or adultery.").
195. See Note, supra note 93, at 1678 n.136 (1991) ("Civil restrictions on
adultery share the same constitutional infirmities as criminal adultery laws.").
196. See supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
197. See Mark Strasser, Fit to Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Ori-
entation, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 841, 861-62 (1997) ("The nexus test requires that a
connection between parental conduct and harm to the child be established if
the parent is to be deprived of custody because of that conduct.").
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It is simply unclear whether civil penalties for adultery are
inappropriately imposed in other contexts-for example, when
determining spousal support. Arguably, penalties are not appro-
priately imposed in that context either, since it may be difficult
to establish which party is "really" at fault when one of the parties
commits adultery. 9 Further, allowing such an imposition may
operate to systematically disadvantage one group-fault-based
models have historically operated to disadvantage women.199
Yet, arguably, a fault system could be devised which would not
disadvantage one group.2"' Further, at least some suggest that
adulterers should have civil penalties imposed against them.201
Courts recognizing that "unforced, private, adult sexual
activity" 20 2 is protected by the right to privacy might seem to have
established that their state constitutions protect adultery and that
only a compelling state interest could justify statutes permitting
the imposition of civil penalties against adulterers.20 3 However,
such a conclusion may not be warranted. Even assuming that the
right of privacy protects consensual, adult, sexual relations, it
does not follow that civil penalties could not be imposed for
adulterous behavior, since an individual might be said to have
waived his or her right to have unforced, private, adult relations
with a nonspouse when he or she took marital VOWS. 204 Using the
198. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28
ARIz. ST. LJ. 773, 788 (1996).
199. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse looks at how fault-based models affect
alimony awards:
Traditional alimony rules, which imposed a fault-based story, punished
women and men unequally. They penalized women but not men for
sexual misconduct by denying alimony to a woman who left her mar-
riage without cause. Men, as the supporting spouses, lost nothing
through their own misconduct, but gained freedom from financial
responsibility by proving their wives' misconduct.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault in a
No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2549 (1994).
200. See id. at 2558 ("Rather than adopting a fault-blind approach to
avoid discrimination, I would ask that judges evaluate male, female, heterosex-
ual, and homosexual conduct by a single standard.").
201. See id. ("A person who agrees to an exclusive, monogamous relation-
ship clearly has wronged the partner when he or she secretly has sex with others
and exposes the faithful partner to sexually transmitted disease. He or she
should be responsible to the mate for the harm inflicted.").
202. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24 (Ga. 1998).
203. Of course, it might be argued that the state has a compelling interest
in preventing adultery. Such a claim has even been made about fornication.
See Stratton, supra note 172, at 789 ("Even if the Court were to find a fundamen-
tal right to engage in sex, fornication statutes would survive strict scrutiny.").
204. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("A State might define the contractual commitment necessary to become
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waiver analysis, civil penalties might still be imposed on the mar-
ried individual having the affair.
Ironically, although a waiver theory would account for why
the marital partner might be sanctioned for having committed
adultery, it is not clear whether such a theory could account for
why the unmarried individual would be subject to having penalties
imposed for having taken part in an adulterous affair, since that
individual would not, for example, have waived the relevant right
by taking marital vows. However, it might be argued that an
unmarried individual does not have a right to have sexual rela-
tions with someone who is married (who, after all, has waived his
or her right to have sexual relations with a nonspouse), since the
latter might be viewed as legally incapable of consenting to such
relations. Consensual relations with a minor are not protected
by the right to privacy, at least in part, because minors are legally
incapable of consenting, and an analogous argument might be of
use to establish why the Constitution does not protect adulterous
relations between adults.
As a general matter, society has grown more willing to allow
unmarried individuals to have consensual, adult sexual relations
without fear of criminal penalty-the trend in current law is not
to have statutes prohibiting fornication 2°5 and not to enforce
those statutes that are on the books. 2 6 Nonetheless, it is also
true that some states have repealed their fornication statutes
while retaining their adultery laws207 and, further, that those
adultery statutes also target the unmarried individual who takes
part in the affair.2 8 Thus, it may well be that society views adul-
eligible for these [marital] benefits to include a commitment of fidelity and
then punish individuals for breaching that contract."); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539
F.2d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 1976) ("What the federal constitution protects is the
right of privacy in circumstances in which it may reasonably be expected. Once
a married couple admits strangers as onlookers, federal protection of privacy
dissolves."); Stratton, supra note 172, at 23 (right to privacy can be waived).
205. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A
Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67
FoRDtAM L. REV. 69, 103 n.174 (1998) (listing the relatively few states that still
have fornication laws); see also Coughlin, supra note 157, at 22 n.79 (suggesting
that some statutes only prohibit open fornication while others would apply to
any sexual activity by single individuals).
206. Even adultery statutes tend not to be enforced. See supra note 171
and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-6-3 (1994) (concerning fornication
which was repealed by P.L. 1989, ch. 214 § 1); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-6-2 (1994)
(Rhode Island adultery statute).
208. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-6-2 (1994) ("[Il1licit sexual intercourse
between any two (2) persons, where either of them is married, shall be deemed
adultery in each.").
788 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
tery much more unfavorably than it does fornication and, at least
arguably, that the Constitution permits but does not require pen-
alties to be imposed if one engages in the former.
The discussion above is merely intended to suggest that a
recognition that the right to privacy protects the right to engage
in consensual adult relations would not entail that individuals
would have the right to commit adultery. Even if the right to
privacy is not premised on a connection to marriage and family
but instead on the right to engage in consensual, adult, intimate
relations, it would not therefore follow that adultery laws are
therefore unconstitutional. A court basing the right to privacy
on connection to family or on the intimacy and fundamental
nature of voluntary, adult relations could quite consistently hold
that consenting sexual relations between unmarried adults are
protected by the right to privacy without also holding that the
Constitution recognizes a right to commit adultery.
CONCLUSION
The current federal right to privacy jurisprudence has family
concerns at its core. This alone has a variety of implications,
since those who seek the right to marry a same-sex partner are
often seeking legal recognition of their already existing families.
Even if Bowers is still good law, same-sex marriage may nonethe-
less be constitutionally protected by the right to privacy. Indeed,
the only nonspecious rationale articulated in Bowers to determine
what is protected by the right to privacy supports rather than
undermines the theory that laws banning same-sex marriage vio-
late federal constitutional guarantees.
Bowers was a disaster, not only because the wrong conclusion
was reached but also because the reasoning was so patently spe-
cious that it is difficult to know what the Court was trying to com-
municate in addition to its disapproval of same-sex relations.
Perhaps the Court was suggesting that sexual relations are not
protected by the Federal Constitution unless they are within the
family context. Arguably, that view is mistaken,2"9 although a
more plausible claim might be that sexual relations within a rela-
tionship are viewed as more fundamental and hence having
more constitutional protection than are individual sex acts
209. See Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, I Il HARv. L. Rrv. 1739, 1745
(1998) ("[L]aws criminalizing homosexual relations between consenting adults
violate fundamental principles of morality and, therefore, constitutional protec-
tions of fundamental rights.").
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outside of a relationship. 210 Even if acts within a relationship are
considered more fundamental than acts outside of one, however,
that of course does not mean that sexual activity outside of rela-
tionships should be criminalized unless they are, for example,
nonconsensual, but merely that sexual activity within relation-
ships would be accorded constitutional priority.
If, indeed, adult, consensual relationships are at least as fun-
damental as adult, consensual relations,211 then those state consti-
tutions protecting the latter should also protect same-sex
relationships. While there are important differences between
the two-legal recognition of same-sex relationships involves a
public recognition of those unions whereas protecting sexual rela-
tions might "merely" mean immunizing them from criminal
prosecution-the entire right to privacy jurisprudence would
have to be turned on its head for nonmarital relations to be rec-
ognized as fundamental without an accompanying recognition of
the right of same-sex partners to form legally recognized families.
On any plausible reading of the right to privacy jurisprudence,
the federal and, especially, certain state constitutional rights to
privacy already include the right of same-sex couples to form the
sacred personal union which is so fundamental in that jurispru-
dence. Any other reading would suggest that rights and activities
already recognized as protected may not enjoy that status for very
long.
210. SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 -ARv. L. REv. 737, 755
(1989) ("There is no reason for personhood to assert that every sexual act is
fundamental to an individual's identity. Rather the intimacy of a sexual rela-
tionship-the bond between two people-might be what is central.").
211. Incestuous relations can presumably be excluded because of the
harms that they can cause. Jocelyn Lamm discusses some of the harms caused
by incest:
Experts have also noted a strong correlation between incest and long-
term damage: severe anxiety and depression, sexual dysfunction, and
multiple personality disorder. Additionally, the internalization of the
anger and anxiety that the incest victim has not been allowed to
express frequently results in a profound self-hatred that causes self-
destructive behavior later on: incestuous childhood victimization com-
monly leads to other abusive relationships, self-mutilation, prostitu-
tion, and drug and alcohol addiction.
Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an
Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2194 (1991).

